securities regulation, should ask whether CST can add anything to our understanding of how the relevant law operates and to the recommendations we make about that operation. In particular, we should ask whether CST provides a basis for critique of the norms operative in corporate law theory.
On a superficial level, the answer to that question is easy. CST can provide a normative framework on the basis of which we can perform our descriptive and prescriptive tasks. In that sense, CST is not functionally different from the other normative frameworks, either acknowledged or unacknowledged, that inform our work on legal issues, whether those frameworks are utilitarian, pragmatic, critical, Aprogressive@ or something else. When we get * Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Many thanks to Steve Bainbridge and Barbara Wall, who provided very different but equally helpful comments on drafts. I look forward to engaging with Steve in the future on both our areas of agreement and disagreement about Catholic Social Thought. Thanks also to the participants in a workshop on Religious Values and Corporate decisionmaking sponsored by Fordham University School of Law, where I presented a version of this paper.
down to the hard work of articulating and applying CST as a normative framework, however, the question becomes more difficult. There are conceptual and practical problems that make it difficult to explain precisely how CST can operate as such a framework for understanding the law of corporations.
For Catholic legal scholars this question of Ahow@ is an urgent one, because for us CST is not just another possible normative framework that we can choose or not choose to take seriously based on intellectual persuasiveness, our curiosity, or fashion. CST is wound intricately into our beliefs and deeply rooted in the Gospel and Catholic natural law traditions. It is thus potentially a challenge to our assumptions about how law should operate. This does not mean that we need to treat every iteration of the social tradition as incontrovertible truth. To the contrary, CST is by definition a sphere of prudential judgment in which we try to discern the meaning of our faith for complex questions of social and economic life. It thus allows for disagreement, change and development in understanding.
2 But CST does embody a coherent world view centered on the core principles of human dignity, the common good, the reciprocity of rights and obligations, the contingency of property rights, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the preferential option for the poor. ? 3 ?
understanding how CST can be translated into a normative framework for a critical understanding of current corporate law theory. Non-Catholic corporate law scholars also may find that CST principles will resonate with purely secular critiques of the dominant corporate law theoretical paradigm.
The Problem of Translation. How does one translate the broad moral norms established in papal documents and bishops' statements into guiding legal principles for the resolution of specific legal problems in the law of corporations? While those documents and statements obviously concern themselves with the goals of economic life, the organization of economic institutions, the relationship between labor and capital, and the moral constraints upon capitalism, they operate at a level of considerable generality. They also usually avoid making specific policy recommendations, recognizing the hierarchy's limited expertise, leaving questions of application to the prudential judgment and moral discernment of the laity. While CST can provide a set of relevant moral norms, much groundwork needs to be done before we can construct a CST theory of the corporation and a CST-inspired method of resolving problems in the law of corporations. Doing that groundwork will require, however, recognition of some major disagreements within the CST tradition itself which are particularly relevant to understanding how the question of the corporation and corporation law should be approached. to tell us about the meaning of CST for the law. My conclusion will be that the vision of the corporation articulated by Michael Novak and other Catholic neo-conservatives, and put forward as a genuine, indeed the most genuine expression of CST, is actually based on a highly selective, ideologically driven and ultimately misleading reading of CST. As such, Novak's understanding of the corporation (and its relationship to the state) does not provide a reliable basis for discerning CST's meaning for corporate law. Of greater potential interest is the work of Stephen
Bainbridge, who aligns himself with Novak, but who uses the analytical tools of law and economics to critique in a more sophisticated and concrete way both the communitarian norms and specific applications of CST. Whether Bainbridge has positioned himself as a critical voice within the social tradition, or against the tradition, remains to be determined. Resolving that question will be important to determining CST's potential relevance for corporate law.
II. The Communitarian Vision

A. The Corporation As a Community and In the Community
The mainstream CST vision of the corporation is communitarian. This vision derives ? 7 ?
from a cluster of CST concepts. The key concept is anthropological: an understanding of the human person as essentially social. As a social being, the person is not merely an autonomous bearer of rights, but part of a community that should be ordered toward the common good, and in which rights and duties are reciprocal. In this view, property and profits are not evil, but are not ends in themselves; they are instrumental to genuine human flourishing and for the production of the common good. These concepts are central to a notion of the corporation as a community, in which the profit motive, while entirely legitimate, is essentially just an Aindicator that a business is functioning well.@ 8 In this vision, the corporation is an institution: (i) that must be dedicated to the flourishing of its employees as human beings; (ii) in which the shareholders' rights of ownership are constrained by duties to others within the corporate community; (iii) whose managers must concern themselves with the common good; and (iv) which, as a matter of John Paul II describes this alienation in business as ensuring Amaximun returns and profits with no concern whether the worker, through his own labor, grows or diminishes as a person.@ This alienation in part stems from persons' refusal to transcend themselves by instrumentalizing everything, including their own relationships, within the firm. For example, managers treat employees well not because they are created in the image of God, but because it will maximize shareholder wealth. This pervasive logic of instrumentalization within corporations today obstructs the habits of mind and heart by which persons authentically give themselves to God and others. Id. at 12. subjective experience of work, leads him to insist upon a subordination of the pursuit of profit to the creation of a participatory community. 14 At a more specific level, the corporation's social responsibilities within the community are a major theme of the communitarian vision. Those responsibilities extend from concern for environmental stewardship to prevention of global labor inequality to non-cooperation with oppressive or racist government regimes, and include much more. 15 The vision also may include a critique of globalization, and a tendency to identify large multinational corporations as prime actors in an economic movement seen as an affront to solidarity.
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In short, the communitarian vision of the corporation as a community and in the 14 See Curran's discussion of the encyclicals LABOREM EXERCENS and CENTESIMUS ANNUS, Curran, supra note 12, at 195, 204-09, with respect to this point. The subordination of profit in John Paul II's thinking is not a function of naive anti-capitalism or leftist bias, but an expression of his Christian personalist understanding of the meaning of work. Property rights are real but are not absolute and must be subordinated to a common good. John Paul calls for creative labor-management alliances, worker-sharing in management and profits, democratization of the workplace B this not so much in the interest of enhancing the bottom line of profit but of offering to the person working a broader, richer set of possible meanings of his or her work. Elshtain, supra note 9, at 34. For criticism of the CST valorization of labor participation in workplace governance, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL L. REV. 741 (1998) . Bainbridge argues, inter alia, that the emphasis on the importance of participatory rights is misplaced for several theoretical and practical reasons, including employees' lack of interest in exercising such rights. From a CST perspective, however, the important thing is the availability of such rights; that employees have varying degrees of interest in exercising them is predictable. Predictable, but lamentable. Indifference to such rights may be a sign of defects in community. 15 These types of CST concern are expressed in the activism of the Catholic religious orders who attempt to place such social justice concerns on the agendas of public corporations. See infra, notes 17-18.
? 11 ? community includes a critical set of assumptions about how corporations should operate. This critical posture is evident in the specific communitarian recommendations for corporate law.
B. Implications for Corporate Law
The CST communitarian vision of the constitution has two major, related implications for the law of corporations. First, its sense of the corporation as an actor in the community encourages a robust view of corporate social responsibility. In this view, the corporation's responsibilities as a social actor extend beyond mere compliance with the external framework of laws relating to labor, the environment, safety and health regulation and the like. This view rejects the presumption that corporations should be required only to obey the laws constituting the vast (and costly) web of regulatory constraints surrounding corporations. Instead, the law of corporate governance should create structures, incentives and penalties designed to ensure corporate awareness of and accountability for its social responsibilities: a legally-constituted social conscience. Legal rules designed to foster a greater sense of corporate social responsibility, even at the expense of profit to the shareholders, are, from this perspective, essential if corporations are to contribute to the common good, rather than use their vast power to undermine it.
Perhaps the best example of this concept of corporate governance is the activity of the which is conceptualized as a community in which stakeholders such as employees have more than a contractual claim. In this vision, furthermore, stakeholders' selfish interests do not simply replace or add themselves to shareholders' selfish interests. There is a shift in emphasis away from wealth maximization as an end in itself, and towards creating the conditions of human flourishing in a broader, relational sense. Managers must do more than mediate among interest groups; they must strive to identify and act upon what is the common good. The norm contested by this version of CST is well established. In its simplest form, the shareholder wealth maximization norm holds that corporate managers should strive to increase shareholder wealth, not that of other corporate stakeholders. Corporate law theory divides over the best means of maximizing shareholder wealth, particularly in light of the agency problem:
managers' tendency to maximize their own wealth, rather than the shareholders'. There are sharp debates over the relative advantages of mandatory rules versus enabling rules in state corporate law, 21 The CST communitarian vision thus distinguishes itself from the secular stakeholder model of corporate governance as well as the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See, for example, James Gordley's application of Thomistic principles to this problem:
Although neither Aristotle nor Thomas contemplated the modern corporation, we have been proposing what one might call an Aristotelian or Thomistic model of corporate responsibility. It has an ethical foundation that both the shareholder and the stakeholder models lack: it is founded not on what each group wants for itself, but on what is normatively good for that group and for others. Unlike the stakeholder model, it explains why the duty of managers to seek a profit is different from their other obligations. Managers who do so will be behaving exactly as they should, provided that they and others are practicing virtues never mentioned by the economists. James Gordley, Virtue and the Ethics of Profit Seeking, in Cortright and Naughton, supra note 11, at 65, 78. Rejection of the stakeholder norm was also crucial to the work of Monsignor John A. Ryan, who rejected the notion of the corporation as merely a collection of selfish interests, in favor of a vision of the "just" or "virtuous" corporation. For a concise discussion of Ryan's theory of corporate governance, see David W. Lutz, Christian Social Thought and Corporate Governance, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE: THE LEGACY OF MONSIGNOR JOHN A. RYAN121 (Robert G. Kennedy, et. al., eds., 2001 ). On Ryan's analysis as an alternative to the stakeholder theory, see id. at 134. This is obviously a highly aspirational view of corporate managers, and does not grapple seriously with the problem of agency costs.
? 15 ? the need for federal regulation of public corporations, the proper limits of private contracting, whether legal rules should facilitate or hinder corporate takeovers, and whether corporate governance should be controlled by managers, directors or shareholders.
22 All these debates, however, are over a common question: how does law best maximize shareholder value? Only at the margins is the shareholder wealth maximization norm questioned.
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The communitarian vision, in contrast, questions that norm directly. By conceptualizing the corporation as a community, it posits managers' responsibility to manage the corporation for the benefit of the non-shareholder members of its community, as well as in the interest of the shareholders. This position expresses the CST concept that profits, while essential to the success of the corporation, are merely instrumental, and not the ultimate purpose of the corporation, thus implicitly rejecting, or at least de-emphasizing the shareholder wealth maximization norm. . Bainbridge argues that control of the corporation is vested in neither the shareholders or the managers, but in the board of directors. The board of directors thus is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather a sui generis body (a sort of platonic guardian) serving as the nexus of the various contracts making up the corporation. Note that Bainbridge's director primacy model does not challenge the shareholder wealth maximization norm: the directors' primary responsibility is still to maximize shareholder value. It is, instead, a rejection of the notion that shareholder value in the public corporation is best maximized through shareholder dominance of corporate governance ("shareholder primacy"). Bainbridge makes this distinction at Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 3 n. 4. (2001) (arguing that the goal of shareholder wealth maximization is not only destroying the corporation, but also the social fabric). 24 In CST, profitability is most frequently understood through the distinction between "foundational" goods and "excellent" goods. Foundational goods are ones we need in order to obtain other goods. Examples would include corporate efficiency and profitability. Excellent goods are those that support the internal development of the person, such as friendship, moral cultivation, or knowledge of and love for God. This distinction is crucial to understanding the purpose of the corporation.
Supporting devaluation of that norm is CST's understanding of shareholders' property rights as enmeshed in a web of reciprocal duties, and that protection of such rights is appropriate only to the extent that such protection contributes to the common good.
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The CST communitarian vision of the corporation is also at odds with the widely-accepted
Coasean theory of the corporate firm as a nexus of contracts. 26 The Acorporation,@ in this view, is a convenient legal fiction for the intersection of providers of debt and equity capital, labor, managerial services and other inputs into an enterprise that is Acollective@ only in an instrumental sense, with the participants bound to each other only contractually, and bound within a firm, rather than across markets, because of the economic efficiency of organizing production in that manner. If
Profitability and efficiency are worthy goals because their realization is foundational to the development of the business as a whole. Nevertheless, foundational goods are not the full story. They account neither for the ultimate motivation of our work nor for the first principles of the business organizations in which we do our work. MODERN ORGANIZATION 45 (2001) . This limited approbation of the profit motive is typical of mainstream CST. See, e.g., Curran's discussion of Pope John Paul II's conditional recognition of "the legitimate role of profit" in CENTESIMUS ANNUS. CURRAN, supra note 12, at 206-09. 25 See, e.g., ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 24, at 47 ("By elevating shareholder wealth to the status of the ultimate good, the shareholder model in effect erects a 'tyranny of foundational goods,' inhibiting managers from considering more excellent goods except as instruments to increase profits."). 26 The foundational theoretical works on the nexus of contracts theory of the corporate firm are R.H. corporate stakeholders' rights are conceived in and determined by contract, there would be little room for an argument that there are non-contractual claims derived from membership in the corporate community that managers must honor. Indeed, the belief that a corporation is only a nexus of contracts, and not a human community bonded by extra-contractual ties, may be regarded as the very antithesis of the CST understanding of the corporation as a community. The largest challenge for this understanding, however, is finding a meaningful way to talk about the public corporation, with its highly fluid set of stakeholders, most of which have very specific, impersonal and often transient relationships to the corporation, as a "community."
This version of CST thus has much in common with those strains of Aprogressive@ corporate law theory 27 that emphasize the need for legal and regulatory structures that would institutionalize a broad sense of corporate social responsibility beyond mere law compliance. It would also cut through current arguments among corporate law theorists about the best way to maximize shareholder value --enhancement of managerial discretion, board empowerment, or facilitating shareholder participation in governance --by proposing a broader conception of the purposes of corporate enterprise and of the common good as the focus of corporate decisionmaking. Historically, the corporation was crucial to the success of democratic capitalism.
III. The Argument From Liberty
The most original social invention of democratic capitalism, in sum, is the private corporation founded for economic purposes. The motivation for this invention was also social: to increase Athe wealth of nations,@ to generate (for the first time in human history) sustained economic development. ? 20 ?
and a political institution. It depends upon and generates certain moral-cultural virtues; it depends upon and generates new political forms. In two short centuries, it has brought about an immense social revolution. It has moved the center of economic activity from the land to industry and commerce. No revolution is without social costs and sufferings, which must be entered on the ledger against benefits won. Universally, however, the idea of economic development has now captured the imagination of the human race. This new possibility of development has awakened the world from its economic slumber.
35
This passage sounds one of Novak's principal themes: the corporation is not just a thing to be used instrumentally, for good or ill. It is a "moral institution." While Novak's language is sometimes unclear, he verges on arguing that the corporation is intrinsically good, particularly when contrasted to the state, for which Novak reserves his deepest suspicions.
Having been the social instrument by which the bourgeoisie, in "scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than all preceding generations together," the publicly held business corporation is arguably the most successful, transformative, and future-oriented institution in the modern world. It has been far more open, more creative, and infinitely less destructive than the nation-state, particularly the totalitarian state.
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The significance of the corporation for Novak, however, lies beyond its contribution to the rise of political capitalism. When focusing directly on current controversies over corporate governance, Novak has articulated a strongly managerialist position. He begins by drawing a sharp distinction between government, with all of the checks and balances needed to restrain its power, and governance of a corporation, which should be designed to support the corporation's nimbleness and creativity.
Wise persons do not want governments to act until they are carried forward, like rhinoceroses rising slowly from the mud by the hydraulic force of a very large and durable consensus. But the same wise persons want business corporations to be able to act quickly, even to turn on a dime when they are losing money or when they spot suddenly arising possibilities, to take the risks for which their investors have entrusted Novak's analysis of corporate governance nods to Coase and other aspects of economic theory, 55 but it derives principally from his philosophical emphasis on the centrality of the independence of the business corporation to democratic capitalism, which he regards as essential to human liberty, flourishing and dignity. In that manner, he attempts to link a profoundly anti-statist defense of liberal economics and opposition to legal rules constraining managerial discretion, to CST theological concepts of the common good, human dignity and Incarnational humanism.
52 Id. at 24-27 (regarding critiques of executive compensation as Aunjust@ or Aunfair@ as reeking of Aenvy@).
53 Id. at 3-9 (distinguishing between managerialist governance of a corporation and participatory government of a state). 54 Novak, TTC, supra note 29, at 60-61 (arguing that Athose critics of the corporation at the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility@ need a better theology of the corporation). 55 Novak, CG, at 12 (discussing Coase, AThe Nature of the Firm,@ supra note 26). Novak's occasional nods to economic theory tend to be superficial make-weights. In using such arguments to lambaste government intervention, he offers nothing about the effect of transactional costs on the efficient allocation of resources or the problem of market failure.
? 27 ? Novak's encomium to capitalism and the role of the corporation within it presumes a deep affinity between capitalism and Christianity. For Novak, the communitarian interpretation of the social tradition is not an organic, authentic expression of the tradition, but a distortion spawned by leftist bias. Ultimately, he sees himself as vindicating the "real" truth of the tradition. It will be argued below that he has it exactly backwards.
B. Beyond Novak: Bainbridge's Integration of Law, Economics and CST
Bainbridge has published a series of pioneering articles that seek to define the theoretical relationship between the jurisprudential school of law and economics and CST, and attempts to apply the two approaches to problems of corporate law in an integrated way that identifies both affinities and tensions between them. While Bainbridge speaks admiringly of Novak, employs his rhetoric, and believes his arguments derive from Novak's, he is actually far less dependant on grandiose and questionable theological propositions, and far more sophisticated than Novak in his critical application of economics to CST precepts on the corporation and corporate law. He thus presents a more serious challenge to the communitarian vision than Novak.
Bainbridge's understanding of law and economics rests on the principle that economic analysis can be normative, and that the key norm is wealth maximization, so that Alaw should seek to increase social wealth, as measured by the dollar equivalents of everything in society. He does so principally in reliance on public choice theory's premise that most legislative attempts to redistribute wealth are driven by highly effective special interest groups at the expense of larger, more diffuse and less effective groups. 63 Interpretation of Christian values as weighted toward state-mandated wealth redistribution would thus seem to him to produce perverse results.
Bainbridge's public choice perspective thus leaves him with significant reservations about CST's critical posture toward the wealth inequalities generated by capitalism, as well as its assumption that law should be used to constrain capitalism's production of wealth inequality.
Bainbridge's ambivalence (or hostility) to the practical consequences of applying CST norms (particularly through government mandates) is expressed in his consideration of specific CST positions on issues of corporate governance. generally, 66 he joins Novak in condemning the extrapolation of this particular policy recommendation from CST principles. His main goal, however, is to determine whether the CST position should be enacted into positive law, and he answers that question through arguments from economics and political theory, rather than theology. Bainbridge concludes that the arguments supporting mandatory labor participation in corporate governance are overbroad, and give the concept a centrality it does not deserve.
He rests his conclusion partially on evidence that most workers do not want such participation and do not particularly benefit from it where it is in effect. 67 More theoretically, Bainbridge objects to the way such mandatory rules reflect social goals inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm that he regards as central to corporate law. 68 He also draws on familiar law and economics arguments to predict that mandatory labor representation on boards would increase agency costs, 69 and that firms have sufficient incentives to enter into implicit contracts protecting employees from possible exploitation by managers. 70 His primary theoretical objection to mandatory participation rules, however, is to the statist character of such intervention.
In critiquing a Bishop's pastoral letter urging participatory governance, Bainbridge argued that:
Despite its democratic rhetoric, Catholic social teaching, as preached by the Bishop's pastoral letter, has a strong statist slant. The Bishops assert that a board of directors' decisions affect a much broader class of constituency groups than merely their shareholders. Employees, managers, customers, creditors, suppliers, and communities all contribute to the enterprise, all have a stake in its success, and all are affected by its actions. Hence, their interests must be reflected in the corporate decisionmaking process. RIGHTS 10-27 (1980) . Finnis, he argues, Aconcedes that one should seek to achieve the good by actions that are efficient for their purposes.@ Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 8. He then concludes that if Aeven a prominent non-consequentialist is willing to admit that cost-benefit analysis comes into play when analyzing natural law claims, it seems we may do so with some confidence.@ Id. with that distinction, they would disagree with the corollary assumption that human flourishing is bound up with policies supporting participatory corporate governance and prioritization of the subjective experience of work, particularly when the state has anything to do with them. The ubiquity of those propositions in both the encyclicals and the bishops' statements shows that they are not the expression of secular leftist biases imported into or grafted onto CST, but rather are an organic expression of a particular vision of the meaning of work and the nature of the human person in community. Indeed, in all fairness, it is the strong classical liberal and libertarian biases that Novak and Bainbridge bring to their reading of CST that is anomalous and inorganic. The normative framework they employ for determining questions of corporate policy and law is thus more of a challenge to than an expression of the Catholic social tradition. A corporate law scholar seeking to employ CST's normative framework in approaching problems of corporate law and policy thus will find their work useful and provocative, but ultimately not satisfactory.
on structural problems of poverty and racism).
? 41 ?
That problem, however, reveals a second problem. While Catholic business ethicists and economists have begun to formulate a conception of the corporate community centered on the notion of the common good, rather than either the shareholder or stakeholder models of corporate governance, and while Catholic activists have used the shareholder proposal mechanism to engage corporations with pursuit of the common good, a CST/communitarian version of corporate law is yet to emerge. A broad frame of reference exists, but translation of the abstract theological and moral principles of CST into legal theory and specific recommendations for legal reform has not really begun. 100 There remains an element of the platitudinous about the CST communitarian vision that needs to be transformed into something more concrete. How, as Bainbridge has pointed out, can a large public corporation be conceptualized and actualized as a community, given the transient nature of the various kinds of interest in the corporation and its hierarchal economic structure? If the stakeholder and shareholder models are both just different ways of actualizing selfish interests, and do not focus on the common good that should be the corporate goal, how do we define the nature and limits of that good, and how do we operationalize it as a goal, recognizing the ? 42 ?
corporate law. There is a great need for theoretical imagination and practical ingenuity in finding ways to overcome those difficulties, if CST is going to be anything other than a challenging, but ultimately irrelevant set of religious reflections on business organization and behavior.
I have argued that Bainbridge's reliance on the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the contractual theory of the firm fits awkwardly with CST. His work represents, however, an escape from the platitudinous. He has shown, in particular, how difficult it is to derive specific guidance from CST's theological propositions and moral norms for corporate law. His criticism of the Bishops' letter may be most valuable in the way it shows how the move from general CST principles to highly specific policy recommendations and prescriptions for legal change is inherently problematic, because such recommendations and prescriptions are subject to disagreement on prudential grounds even among people who share a Catholic perspective.
Nevertheless, if CST is going to be meaningful, it must provide a means for moving from the general to the specific. Bainbridge has led the way in showing how that might be done in corporate law theory. His critique of the Bishops' letter and CST doctrine on participatory governance, however, may be more of a fundamental criticism of basic CST precepts themselves rather than a prudential disagreement with specific applications of those precepts. There are versions of corporate law theory more congruent with CST's communitarian vision than Bainbridge's. While wholly secular in inspiration, those versions of corporate law theory that emphasize broader participation in corporate governance, stronger mechanisms of corporate accountability, legal structures for corporate social responsibility, and, ultimately, rethinking of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, provide a set of analytical tools that would help CST move from moral exhortation to a concrete agenda for change. In return, CST would provide corporate law theory a ? 43 ?
normative framework that would give its reform agenda greater moral and spiritual weight and conviction.
